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RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2394  
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 0997  
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 3356  
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 4785  
RUEHKS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 1566  
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2559  
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 003158

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TAGS: [SENV](#) [KGHG](#) [PREL](#) [ENRG](#) [KSCA](#) [JA](#)  
SUBJECT: JAPAN GETS READY FOR POZNAN -- WORKING TO KEEP  
EXPECTATIONS REALISTIC FOR COP 14

REF: TOKYO 2794

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Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 b/d.

11. (C) SUMMARY: Top Japanese bureaucrats dealing with environment and energy policy report unrealistic expectations among EU and other governments in the run-up to COP 14 in Poznan December 1-12. These officials all report trying to convince European Commission and EU member governments not to try to ram through agreements on targets or other points the U.S. has traditionally opposed. They note a continued Japanese stance that a post-Kyoto regime to reduce greenhouse gas emissions needs to include China and India as well as the U.S., and that China, India, and the other emerging market economies need to commit to steps to limit greenhouse gas emissions, although their base points, targets, and expected levels of cuts may be different than for developed countries. For its own part, Japan continues to advocate its sectoral approach and to argue for a different base year than 1990, e.g., 2000 or, more commonly mentioned, 2005. END SUMMARY.

12. (C) Emboffs held meetings November 4-10 with key Japanese officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI); and Ministry of Environment (MOE); as well as a Special Adviser to the Cabinet to discuss the Japanese position going into the Poznan COP 14.

Charges Some Looking to Take Advantage of U.S. Transition  
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13. (C) Senior officials at METI and MOFA noted they have told EU officials it would be a mistake to use the transition in the U.S. to slam positions through the Poznan COP 14, e.g. on targets, about which the U.S. has traditionally had concerns or reservations. Expectations in some capitals for Poznan are too lofty, Japanese officials report. METI Director General (DG) for Natural Resources and Energy Policy Kazuhiko Hombu and Global Environmental Affairs DG Jun Arima told Econoffs unrealistic expectations going into Poznan abound, as exemplified by the European Union's push for 25-40 percent emission reductions from 1990 levels by 2020, the possible reliance on offsets to meet such goals, and developing countries' ideas about the scope and type of technology transfer to address climate change.

14. (C) MOFA Global Issues DG Shinsuke Sugiyama also noted these concerns in a separate meeting and said Japan is committed to working with all parties to make sure the Poznan meeting is productive without alienating the U.S. (for example by adopting unrealistic emissions reduction goals or unacceptable technology transfer principles). Commenting on the time required to confirm U.S. appointees and the uncertain Japanese political situation, Sugiyama hypothesized that even COP 15 in Copenhagen may come and go before a truly global consensus can be formed. Similarly, Ambassador Mutsuyoshi Nishimura, Special Adviser to the Cabinet for international climate change policy, stated the window of opportunity for real progress at COP 15 in Copenhagen may already have closed. It may take another six months after Copenhagen before a post-2012 regime for cutting greenhouse gases can be achieved. He also thought full participation by China, India and other emerging market countries may not occur until 2020, even though China may come forward with

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some tangible actions in the current round of talks. Japan, Nishimura suggested, would probably need to compromise and accept less than full participation by China in a post-2012 climate change regime.

#### Realism Required, Flexibility Is Key

15. (C) Environment Ministry officials agreed EU and other governments need to adopt a more realistic approach for Poznan and also stressed flexibility would be the key to achieving a breakthrough. Environment Ministry Global Environment DG Tatsushi Terada and Councillor for Global Environment Masaru Moriya stressed that the goals of a post-Kyoto framework need to be ambitious, but the methods to achieve them must be practical. METI DG Hombu and MOFA DG Sugiyama agreed the post-2012 framework must be realistic and pragmatic. Sugiyama and Amb. Nishimura emphasized their efforts to scale back EU demands and temper unrealistic expectations for the Poznan and Copenhagen COP meetings. Nishimura also argued much of the world's public opinion remains opposed to the U.S. on climate change.

16. (C) The MOE officials said Japan will likely support using multiple baseline years to calculate emissions targets and that flexibility on base years may help to involve not only the U.S. but also China, India, and other emerging market and developing countries. The EU is unlikely, in the MOE's view, to abandon the 1990 baseline. Moriya asked whether the U.S. would require the exact same commitments from China and India as from the United States in order to agree to a post-Kyoto framework.

#### Japan's Sectoral Approach

17. (C) Environment Ministry officials provided an English translation of Japan's submission to COP 14. (Copy faxed to EAP/J.) It includes a proposal to differentiate among developing countries based on their capacity to take action to address climate change (ref). Moriya asserted Japan's

proposed sectoral approach would help developing countries realize the necessary transfer of environmental technologies.

METI DG Hombu said Japan feels the comparability of reduction targets -- as is enabled when a sectoral approach is used -- is fundamental to a new framework.

#### GOJ "Asks" and Expectations

18. (C) Consistent with Japan's longstanding position that the U.S., India, and China must be included in the post-Kyoto arrangement, Amb. Nishimura and MOFA DG Sugiyama each said Japan will not accept an agreement that does not have U.S. and Chinese support. Japan, therefore, is committed to working with all the players to achieve consensus.

19. (C) METI DG Hombu said Japan expects commitment at COP 14 that the U.S. will be involved in setting the post-Kyoto framework. He also said Japan prefers to set greenhouse gas intensity targets, rather than a single gross emission target, and is interested in hearing the new administration's thoughts as well on this point.

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10. (C) MOE DG Terada and Moriya said Japan has encountered strong resistance to its UNFCCC submission (ref) from developing countries, and seeks U.S. support for its ideas.

SCHIEFFER